Abstract. In 2012, Kim and Kwak proposed an anonymous authentication scheme for mobility networks which claimed to improve upon the weakness of replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack in Mun et al.'s scheme. However, their proposed scheme is still vulnerable to replay and DoS attacks. A serious problem in their scheme is that cannot get the session key . In order to improve these shortcomings, we propose an enhanced secure authentication scheme with anonymity for roaming in mobility networks. The security analysis of our scheme demonstrates maintaining all of the security in Mun et al.'s scheme, but also efficiently improves upon the weaknesses in Kim-Kwak scheme.
Introduction
With popularization of smart phones and diverse applications, mobility networks are increasingly needed for mobile users. Because mobility networks transfer messages using electromagnetic waves, the message is vulnerable to be intercepted and may expose the user to privacy concerns. Many anonymous authentication schemes with roaming have been proposed for mobile networks to protect user's privacy [1, 3, 4, [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . In 2004, Zhu and Ma [17] first proposed a roaming authentication scheme with anonymity for wireless networks. However, in 2006, Lee et al. [4] pointed out that Zhu-Ma's scheme failed to anonymize the user and did not provide backward secrecy of the session key. Furthermore, Lee et al. also proposed an authentication scheme (LHL) with anonymity for wireless networks to provide anonymity and backward secrecy. Unfortunately, Wu et al. [10] proved that LHL-scheme still did not efficiently remove the security weaknesses and proposed an improved authentication scheme (WLT) with anonymity. In 2009, Lee et al. [5] and Xu and Feng [11] showed that the WLT-scheme had improved the weakness of backward secrecy, but did not efficiently protect anonymity of users.
Recently, Mun et al. [9] proposed a new framework of anonymous authentication scheme (MHLYC) to improve the weakness of anonymity in previous schemes. Kim and Kwak [3] found that the MH-LYC scheme is still weak against replay and manin-the-middle (MITM) attacks while also proposing an improved anonymous authentication scheme (KimKwak) . Unfortunately, the Kim-Kwak scheme did not improve resilience against replay and denial-of- , i.e., MU cannot roaming in the 's service area, according to our security analysis. In order to provide anonymity and protection against various attacks, we propose an enhanced secure authentication scheme for roaming in mobility networks in this paper. According to our analysis, we prove that the proposed scheme not only maintains all of the security in MHLYC-scheme but also improves the weakness against replay in the Kim-Kwak scheme.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: In Sections 2 and 3, we will review the Kim-Kwak scheme and prove the weakness in Kim-Kwak scheme. Then, we will propose an enhanced secure anonymous authentication scheme to overcome the weakness in the Kim-Kwak scheme in Section 4 and provide security analysis in Section 5. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
Review of Kim and Kwak Scheme
In this section, we will briefly review the anonymous authentication scheme proposed by Kim and Kwak [3] . There are three phases in this scheme: registration, authentication and key establishment and update session key. The notations of the Kim-Kwak scheme are shown in Table 1 and the procedure of the Kim-Kwak scheme follows.
Registration phase
In this phase, the new computes ℎ( ∥ ) and ℎ( ∥ ) and then sends , ℎ( ∥ ) and ℎ( ∥ ) to for registration. After registering with , will get a smart card with , , , , , and ℎ(⋅) from and then stores into it. Fig. 1 shows the procedure of the registration phase in detail. 
Authentication and key establishment phase
can be authenticated by via after registering with . In this phase,
) and then sends and to . Next, transfers and to for authenticating . will check these messages to authenticate after receiving them from . After authenticates MU, he will send , ; and to . Finally, can establish the session key between itself and by when receiving the above messages from . Fig. 2 shows the procedure of the authentication and key establishment phase in detail.
Update session key phase
If continually stays at the same , it can update the session key with . The update session key phase in Kim-Kwak scheme [3] is the same with MHLYC-scheme [9] .
Weakness of Kim-Kwak Scheme
In 2012, Kim and Kwak [3] proposed an improved anonymous authentication scheme to overcome that MHLYC was susceptible to the replay attack and MITM attacks. According to our security analysis, however,the Kim-Kwak scheme did not improve resilience against replay or DoS attacks. Another issue of this scheme is that cannot get the session key . Following is a brief analysis of the security of the Kim-Kwak scheme.
Replay attack: in the authentication and key establishment phase
In this phase, the attacker is able to intercept messages and between and and tries to replay it to to impersonate . Because does not store ℎ( ∥ ) into its database after authenticating , the attacker still can authenticate with by using intercepted messages and impersonate to communicate with others successfully.
DoS attack: in update session key phase
In this phase, the attacker can calculate , for = 1 … , and constantly send it to for update session key. Because does not check the validity of , it will make a response with and for each request. Therefore, the attacker can mount DoS attack with a flood of packets for request to block services of .
cannot get the session key
obtains and from and , respectively.
still can not compute = ℎ( ) because is calculated by and it is difficult to derive a from . Therefore, cannot calculate and establish the session key with in the authentication and key establishment phase.
Proposed Enhanced Secure Anonymous Authentication Scheme
wants to register with before using 's roaming service. The registration phase procedure is as follows:
, ℎ( ∥ ), ℎ( ∥ ) generates a random number by (⋅) , computes ℎ( ∥ ) and ℎ( ∥ ) with his own password .
and ℎ( ∥ ) from into its database and computes = ℎ( ) ℎ( ) , = ℎ( ∥ ) ℎ( ∥ ) and = ℎ(ℎ( ∥ ) ∥ ℎ( ∥ )) . Then, stores , and ℎ(⋅) in the smart card and delivers it to through a secure channel.
Authentication and establishment of session key
can conduct anonymous authentication while roaming via after registering with . The procedure of authentication and establishment of session key phase is shown as follows: Step 1. Compute ℎ( ∥ ) = ℎ( ).
Step 2. Compute = ℎ(ℎ( ∥ ) ∥ ℎ( ∥ )).
Step 3. Compute ℎ( ∥ ) = .
Step 4. Compute = ℎ( ∥ ) ℎ( ∥ ).
Step 5. Compute ℎ( ∥ ) = 4.
Step 6. Compute = ℎ(ℎ( ∥ ) ∥ ℎ( ∥ )).
Step 7. Check whether equals to .
If it exists , stores ℎ( ∥ ) in its database for next session. 
Security and Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze our proposed scheme in terms of security and performance and demonstrate the comparisons of security and performance with previous proposed schemes [3, 4, 9, 10, 17] in Table 2  and Table 3 , respectively.
Anonymity
Assume the attacker intercepts messages and from to . The attacker cannot ascertain the real identity of the mobile user because the attacker does not know and .
Secrecy of session key
In the authentication and key establishment and update session key phases, and utilize different and to establish the session key = ℎ( ) . Since ai and bi are different for each session and they are not determined by context, the attacker cannot calculate by or .
Man-in-the-middle attack
In the authentication and establishment of session key phase, the attacker cannot establish a fake Man-inthe-middle session key between and because of mutual authentication between and by and , respectively.
Replay attack for authentication and establishment of session key phase
In the authentication and establishment of session key phase, selects a new random number and computes = ℎ( ∥ ) and = ℎ(ℎ( ∥ ) ∥ ℎ( ∥ )) . When receiving messages from , computes and compares it with received for authenticating . If it exists, stores ℎ( ∥ ) into its database for the next authentication phase. Otherwise, denies this connection.
Attackers can attempt to perform replay attacks by the following two steps:
Step 1. Attackers intercept and = ℎ(ℎ( ∥ ) ∥ ℎ( ∥ )) from to .
Step 2. Attackers replay the intercepted message to .
However, the attacker still can not authenticate with by replaying the previous and from to because = ℎ(ℎ( ∥ ) ∥ ℎ( ∥ )) is not equal to .
Replay attack for update session key phase
In the update session key phase, encrypts messages with the last session key while updating the session key with . Because the session keys between the present phase and the last phase are different and have no correlation, the attacker can not update the session key by replaying messages transmitted from to in the update session key phase. 
Denial of service attack
In the update session key phase, encrypts biP with and sends it with to . Because will extract a and from its database by for verifying and is different for each session, the attacker cannot mount DoS attack to block services of .
Performance comparison versus other schemes
In order to compare performance between schemes, we calculate the total operations in authentication phase for each scheme. From [2] , authors provide an equivalence rate for comparison where RSA = 2 , DES = 2 000 , and SHA1 = 20 000 operations per second. So for computing execution time, we equivalate Asymmetric, Symmetric and Hash operations with 0.5 , 0.0005 , and 0.00005 seconds, respectively. Note that XOR operations are discounted and considered free in these comparisons. Table 3 shows that the computation of our proposed scheme with previous schemes [3, 4, 9, 10, 17] and proves that the computational cost of our proposed scheme is similar to Kim-Kwak scheme. Our security and performance analysis demonstrates that our proposed scheme not only retains the same computational overhead as Kim-Kwak scheme but also overcomes all weaknesses mentioned in Section 3. Furthermore, Our proposed scheme also provides several security functionalities such as anonymity, secrecy of session key and mutual authentication, and preventing impersonation, replay, MITM and DoS attacks.
Conclusions
In this paper, security analysis of the Kim-Kwak scheme determined susceptibility to replay and DoS attacks. In addition, cannot roam in the 's service area because cannot create a session key with . In response, we propose an enhanced anonymous authentication scheme with roaming for mobility networks to overcome these weaknesses. We prove that our proposed scheme not only to prevents replay and DoS attacks but also allows to establish a session key with .
